Packet Storm - Information Security News, Files, Tools, Exploits, Advisories and Whitepapers http://packetstormsecurity.org/ en-us Mon, 28 May 2012 13:16:01 GMT 144400 http://packetstormsecurity.org/ http://www.google-analytics.com/__utm.gif?utmwv=1.3&utmn=1285407127&utmcs=ISO-8859-1&utmsr=31337x31337&utmsc=32-bit&utmul=en-us&utmje=0&utmfl=-&utmcn=1&utmdt=Files%u2248%20Packet%20Storm&utmhn=packetstormsecurity.org&utmr=-&utmp=%2Fpapers%2Fcryptography%2F&utmac=UA-18885198-1&utmcc=__utma%3D32867617.1285407127.1338210961.1338210961.1338210961.1%3B%2B__utmz%3D32867617.1338210961.1.1.utmccn%3D(direct)%7Cutmcsr%3D(direct)%7Cutmcmd%3D(none) http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/109489/469.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/109489/469.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/109489/Cryptanalysis-Of-INCrypt32-In-HIDs-iCLASS-Systems.html Tue, 07 Feb 2012 01:10:14 GMT The cryptographic algorithm called INCrypt32 is a MAC algorithm to authenticate participants, RFID cards and readers, in HID Global's iCLASS systems. HID's iCLASS cards are widely used contactless smart cards for physical access control. Although INCrypt32 is a heart of the security of HID's iCLASS systems, its security has not been evaluated yet since the specification has not been open to public. In this paper, they reveal the specification of INCrypt32 by reverse engineering an iCLASS card and investigate the security of INCrypt32. As a result, we show that the secret key of size 64 bits can be recovered using only 218 MAC queries if the attacker can request MAC for chosen messages of arbitrary length. If the length of messages is limited to pre-determined values by the authentication protocol, the required number of MAC queries grows to 242 to recover the secret key. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/107961/Baseline_Requirements_V1.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/107961/Baseline_Requirements_V1.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/107961/Baseline-Requirements-For-Publicly-Trusted-Certificates-1.0.html Sat, 17 Dec 2011 00:33:23 GMT This document is version 1.0, as adopted by the CA/Browser Forum on 22 Nov. 2011 with an Effective Date of 1 July 2012. These Baseline Requirements describe an integrated set of technologies, protocols, identity-proofing, lifecycle management, and auditing requirements that are necessary (but not sufficient) for the issuance and management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates; Certificates that are trusted by virtue of the fact that their corresponding Root Certificate is distributed in widely-available application software. The Requirements are not mandatory for Certification Authorities unless and until they become adopted and enforced by relying–party Application Software Suppliers. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/107789/conj.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/107789/conj.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/107789/On-Equivalence-Between-Zeta-And-R-Sequence.html Tue, 13 Dec 2011 01:52:58 GMT This paper covers a conjecture of equivalence between a statement regarding Ξ matrix and Zeta. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/107788/paper_new2.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/107788/paper_new2.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/107788/On-The-R-Sequence-And-Prime-Key-Set-Problem.html Tue, 13 Dec 2011 01:50:40 GMT This document covers the introduction of the R-sequence, i.e. the sequence of numbers closely related to the distribution of the prime numbers. The paper contains its connection to ζ and Mobius function. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/105474/SSL_comp_report2011.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/105474/SSL_comp_report2011.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/105474/TLS-SSL-Hardening-And-Compatibility-Report.html Fri, 30 Sep 2011 14:22:22 GMT This report gives general recommendations as to how to configure SSL/TLS in order to provide state of the art authentication and encryption. The options offered by SSL engines grew from the early days since Netscape developed SSL2.0. The introduction of TLS made matters more challenging as servers and clients offer different sets of available options depending on which SSL engine (OpenSSL, NSS, SCHANNEL, etc.) they use. Finding the middle ground has proven difficult especially as the supported protocols and cipher suites are mostly not documented. To make matters more complicated Browsers may not use all functionality offered by the SSL stack, this report will only list functionality used by current Browsers. This report provides an overview of the currently available TLS options across Servers and Clients and allows you to offer support for a wide variety of Browsers an offer "good enough" security. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/104224/aesbc.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/104224/aesbc.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/104224/Biclique-Cryptanalysis-Of-The-Full-AES.html Fri, 19 Aug 2011 14:29:52 GMT Whitepaper called Biclique Cryptanalysis of the Full AES. Since Rijndael was chosen as the Advanced Encryption Standard, improving upon 7-round attacks on the 128-bit key variant or upon 8-round attacks on the 192/256-bit key variants has been one of the most difficult challenges in the cryptanalysis of block ciphers for more than a decade. This paper discusses shortcut attacks on AES. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/101679/timing-attacks.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/101679/timing-attacks.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/101679/Remote-Timing-Attacks-Are-Still-Practical.html Wed, 25 May 2011 14:00:31 GMT This whitepaper describes a timing attack vulnerability in OpenSSL's ladder implementation for curves over binary fields. They use this vulnerability to steal the private key of a TLS server where the server authenticates with ECDSA signatures. Using the timing of the exchanged messages, the messages themselves, and the signatures, they mount a lattice attack that recovers the private key. Finally, they describe and implement an effective countermeasure. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/93726/elliptic-curve.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/93726/elliptic-curve.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/93726/Elliptic-Curve-Cryptography-Anomalous-Curves.html Sat, 11 Sep 2010 18:27:29 GMT Whitepaper called Elliptic Curve Cryptography Anomalous Curves. Written in Spanish. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/87507/LM_vs_MD5.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/87507/LM_vs_MD5.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/87507/Whitepaper-Comparing-MD5-To-Windows-LM-Hashes.html Mon, 22 Mar 2010 21:51:20 GMT This whitepaper is a comparison of the security provider by Window's Local Area Network Manager and Message Digest Five hashes in the application of personal and business computers. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/85627/kryptographie.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/85627/kryptographie.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/85627/Cryptography-The-Magic-Of-The-Asymmetric.html Tue, 26 Jan 2010 07:31:26 GMT Whitepaper called Cryptography - The Magic Of The Asymmetric. Written in German. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/85011/SSL_sniffing.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/85011/SSL_sniffing.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/85011/SSL-Sniffing.html Mon, 11 Jan 2010 22:30:09 GMT Whitepaper called SSL Sniffing. It discusses the basic use of SSL and what types of attack tools and methodologies exist. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/60927/breaking-rsa.txt http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/60927/breaking-rsa.txt http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/60927/breaking-rsa.txt.html Thu, 15 Nov 2007 02:11:14 GMT Whitepaper titled Breaking RSA: Totient indirect factorization. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/38688/Cryptography.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/38688/Cryptography.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/38688/Cryptography.pdf.html Thu, 14 Jul 2005 07:25:36 GMT Whitepaper entitled Application Level Cryptography: Combination Stream And Block Ciphering Using Double Encryption Algorithms. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/38606/practical-public-key-crypto.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/38606/practical-public-key-crypto.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/38606/practical-public-key-crypto.pdf.html Tue, 12 Jul 2005 15:04:16 GMT Practical Applications of Public-key Cryptography: Securing Email Communications with PGP. An 11 page tutorial that discusses practical uses of PGP desktop, the commercial version of PGP. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/36308/Brief_intro_to_crypt.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/36308/Brief_intro_to_crypt.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/36308/Brief_intro_to_crypt.pdf.html Sat, 26 Feb 2005 05:30:02 GMT Brief paper discussing the basics of cryptography and the difference between symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/35892/0501038.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/35892/0501038.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/35892/0501038.pdf.html Wed, 26 Jan 2005 17:06:51 GMT White paper discussing the new ASH family of hashing algorithms. They are based off of modifications to the existing SHA-2 family and were designed with two main goals in mind: Providing increased collision resistance and increasing mitigation of security risks post-collision. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/35675/007.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/35675/007.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/35675/007.pdf.html Wed, 12 Jan 2005 05:56:05 GMT White paper discussing the misuse of RC4 in Microsoft Word and Excel, where the initialization vector of RC4 remains the same when an encrypted document gets modified and saved, http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/35125/stripwire-1.1.tar.gz http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/35125/stripwire-1.1.tar.gz http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/35125/stripwire-1.1.tar.gz.html Tue, 07 Dec 2004 07:25:23 GMT Stripwire is a tool which demonstrates vulnerabilities in md5 checks described in this paper. Contains a perl script which proves that if md5(x) == md5(y), then md5(x+q) == md5(y+q) (assuming length(x) and length(y) are 0 mod 64, and q is any arbitrary data). This is true because once two blocks converge upon the same hash, the nature of them being different has thereafter been lost. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/35124/md5_someday.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/35124/md5_someday.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/35124/md5_someday.pdf.html Tue, 07 Dec 2004 07:18:23 GMT Collision vulnerabilities in MD5 Checksums - It is possible to create different executables which have the same md5 hash. The attacks remain limited, for now. The attack allows blocks in the checksumm'd file to be swapped out for other blocks without changing the final hash. This is an excellent vector for malicious developers to get unsafe code past a group of auditors, perhaps to acquire a required third party signature. Alternatively, build tools themselves could be compromised to embed safe versions of dangerous payloads in each build. A tool to demonstrate these vulnerabilities is available here. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/34069/199.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/34069/199.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/34069/199.pdf.html Tue, 17 Aug 2004 21:47:37 GMT Whitepaper written on MD5 collisions that have been discovered. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/30905/ssl-timing.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/30905/ssl-timing.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/30905/ssl-timing.pdf.html Fri, 14 Mar 2003 15:41:16 GMT A paper written on timing attacks against OpenSSL 0.9.7. In this experiment, it shows that the extraction of private keys from an OpenSSL-based webserver is realistic. Monitoring about a million queries allows an attackers to remotely extract a 1024-bit RSA private key. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/29720/steg1.txt http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/29720/steg1.txt http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/29720/steg1.txt.html Sat, 21 Sep 2002 07:57:57 GMT Stenographied File Transfer Using Posix File Locks - How to transfer information to other users on secure systems by communicating with locked files. Includes some sample code that uses 32 locked files to transfer data on Posix systems. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/29501/sub.txt http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/29501/sub.txt http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/29501/sub.txt.html Fri, 30 Aug 2002 04:27:37 GMT Substitution Ciphers - This paper discusses the five classic substitution ciphers and how they are solved. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/26587/trans.txt http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/26587/trans.txt http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/26587/trans.txt.html Wed, 21 Aug 2002 06:48:45 GMT Basic Transposition Ciphers - All they do is shuffle the characters. http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/25257/ssh-timing.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/25257/ssh-timing.pdf http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/25257/ssh-timing.pdf.html Mon, 03 Sep 2001 20:57:20 GMT Timing Analysis of Keystrokes and Timing Attacks on SSH - Watching the timing between keystrokes sent over SSH and other encrypted protocols, some information can be obtained about the contents of the packet.